We consider a model of a service system that delivers two non-substitutable services to a market of heterogenous users. The first service is delivered subject to a "guaranteed" (G) processing rate, and the second is a "best-effort" (BE) type service in which residual capacity not allocated to the guaranteed class is shared among BE-users. Users, in turn, are sensitive to both price and congestion-related effects. The service provider's objective is to optimally design the system so as to extract maximum revenues. The design variables in this problem consist of a pair of static prices for the two services, a policy that controls admission of G-users into the system, and the mechanism by which users are informed of the state of congestion in the system. Since these objectives are difficult to address using exact analysis, we pursue approximations that are tractable and lead to structural insights. Specifically, we first solve a deterministic relaxation of the original objective to obtain a "fluid-optimal" solution which is subsequently evaluated and refined to account for stochastic fluctuations. Using diffusion limits, we derive approximations that yield the following structural results: (i) pricing rules derived from the deterministic analysis are "almost" optimal; (ii) the optimal operational regime for the system is close to heavy-traffic, and; (iii) real-time congestion notification results in increased revenues. Numerical results illustrate the accuracy of the proposed approximations and validate the aforementioned structural insights.
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed an explosive growth in services offered over the Internet via the worldwide-web. These web-based services include electronic commerce, internet telephony, streaming audio and video, e-mail and information retrieval, to name but a few examples. In an effort to address the processing requirements of these diverse applications and better segment the market of potential users, service providers are attempting to offer multiple grades of service so that users are differentiated according to their quality-of-service (QoS) requirements and willingness to pay. Inspired by these recent developments, in particular the emergence of information services, this paper introduces a simple stylized model of differentiated services, and addresses questions of optimal system design.
The goal of our model is to capture some of the stylized features that characterize information services. The first feature is that congestion in such services typically manifests itself as a degradation of the processing rate which in turn leads to delays. This should be contrasted with more traditional service operations where delays are driven by queueing effects. The second is the QoS levels that are common in the delivery of these type of services. In particular, in many instances a service provider may offer "real-time" applications that necessitate a guaranteed performance (e.g., software on demand), and "low QoS" applications that may be delivered subject to rate degradations (e.g., on-line help desk or database searches).
Motivated by such QoS provisioning, this paper considers a system that delivers two nonsubstitutable services or application classes. The first service is delivered subject to a "guaranteed" (G) processing rate, and the second is a "best-effort" (BE) type service in which residual capacity not allocated to the G-class is shared among BE-users. An important feature of this model is that both services are delivered using common processing resources, i.e., capacity is not split in such a way that a fraction is dedicated to each service class. Demand for service in each application class is determined by the total cost faced by its users, this being comprised of a class-specific usage fee and a congestion-related cost.
In terms of probabilistic primitives, we assume that nominal connection requests arrive according to independent Poisson processes, and the processing requirements of the two services are exponentially distributed with potentially different rates. With these assumptions in place, the system dynamics are Markovian. We note that our formulation and analysis focuses on the overall demand induced by a given price and congestion level. That is, we do not attempt to model the flow or packet level dynamics that characterize the means of delivering information services.
The service provider's objective is to extract maximum revenues by: (i) optimally pricing the two service classes; (ii) choosing an admission control policy for guaranteed-rate requests; and (iii.) selecting the mechanism by which users "learn" about the state of congestion in the system. In achieving these goals, the service provider is assumed to possess full information on the customer types. Note that the congestion notification mechanism alluded to above introduces feedback: delay-averse users may be more reluctant to connect to the system when congestion is high, and this in turn reduces congestion thus inducing more users to connect. This process then continues until an equilibrium is reached, a notion that is central to our analysis. In addition to the design objectives stated above, our analysis strives to illuminate various other aspects that characterize the performance of the system, e.g., magnitude of congestion-related effects, the nominal operating point for the system and other equilibrium properties.
The objectives mentioned above are difficult to address directly, even under simplifying Markovian assumptions. In particular, the stochastic modulation of capacity available to BE-users and the feedback mechanism that is introduced by congestion notification, render the above design problems intractable as far as exact analysis is concerned. Instead, we propose an approximate analysis that gives rise to important structural insights and supports simple computations. In hindsight, this approach is seen to be quite accurate in large capacity systems. The first step of this hierarchical analysis consists of formulating a deterministic relaxation of the original optimization problem. The solution to this problem yields "fluid-optimal" per-access prices for the two services, and suggests an admission policy for G-users. The latter amounts to giving "high priority" to the service class that generates more revenue per unit of capacity per unit time. Since it is natural to think of this value being higher for services that require strict performance guarantees, we will hereafter assume that indeed the guaranteed service is given "high priority" in the sense that its users are always admitted when capacity is available. (As will be argued in what follows, the main structural insights that arise in this setting are essentially preserved when this priority is switched to the BE-class.) The second step of this analysis examines the performance of the system under the "fluid-optimal" solution, assessing the effects of stochastic fluctuations. Subsequently, in the final step, the fluid-optimal solution is refined to account for stochastic fluctuations so as to further optimize system performance and extract additional revenues. In terms of methodology, the approximate analysis described above hinges to a large extent on diffusion limits. This machinery enables us to pursue several objectives that would otherwise not be tractable via exact analysis.
The main contributions of this paper are the following.
i.) Pricing and admission rules derived via deterministic analysis. The fluid-optimal prices and the associated admission control policy for G-users turn out to be "almost optimal." Namely, the revenues extracted by these choices when implemented in the stochastic system are very close to those generated by the optimal rule. (See Theorem 2.)
ii.) System operational regime and structural insights. Under nominal assumptions on the revenue functions (essentially, concave increasing), fluid-optimal prices derived via the deterministic analysis (see Proposition 1) induce an equilibrium operating point where utilization is high, congestion effects are "small," and stochastic fluctuations are of order square root of the system "size." (See (i)-(iv) in Theorem 1.) When the mean service requirement is identical in the two classes, the system equilibrium can be approximated with high accuracy via a solution to a simple fixed point equation. (See (10) in Theorem 1).
iii.) Performance analysis when classes are differentiated with respect to their service requirements. A simple approximation that relies on underlying diffusion limits is proposed, so as to derive closed-form approximations as in Theorem 1. (See Section 6.) iv.) Second order price correction. The structural insights that follow from the equilibrium analysis give rise to a simple "second-order" price correction that refines the fluid-optimal price so as to extracts higher revenues. (See Section 7.) v.) The value of real-time congestion notification. A system that informs users of "realtime" congestion generates more revenue than one that provides static congestion information; the magnitude of this contribution is seen to be "second-order." (See Numerical results validate the structural insights and illustrate the accuracy of the approximations discussed above.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. This section concludes with a review of the literature, while Section 2 describes the system model and design objectives. Section 3 pursues a deterministic analysis and Section 4 derives the system behavior under the deterministic solution.
Section 5 discusses some of the qualitative insights extracted from the analysis in Sections 3 and 4. Sections 6-8 focus on extensions and refinements of the previous analysis focusing on nonidentical service rates, second order optimization, and the economic value of real-time congestion notification, respectively. Finally, there are two appendices: Appendix A contains background material on diffusion limits; and Appendix B contains the proofs.
Literature review. The stylized model that we formulate is similar to the one first introduced by Das and Srikant (2000) to model Best-effort type traffic in the data network context. They derived diffusion approximations for this single class system in the so-called Halfin-Whitt heavy traffic regime. In a previous paper, Maglaras and Zeevi (2003a) studied a variant of the DasSrikant model pursuing problems of economic optimization and optimal system design for a singleclass system serving only BE-users. The work in Maglaras and Zeevi (2003a) covered both profit maximization as well as social welfare objectives adopting an equilibrium formulation that is driven by the treatment in Mendelson and Whang (1990) [see also Basar and Srikant (2002) for a related study of different flavor.] Here, we seek to extend this analysis by considering a canonical twoclass system model and in addition consider further design issues, such as admission control and congestion notification mechanisms, and their economic value. In contrast to the single-class case discussed in Maglaras and Zeevi (2003a) , the analysis of the two class system covered in the current paper hinges on diffusion approximations of the type derived recently in Maglaras and Zeevi (2004) .
The main result from Maglaras and Zeevi (2004) serves as an auxiliary result in several proofs in the current paper, and is cited in Appendix A for completeness.
The primary motivation to focus on Guaranteed and Best-effort service classes is driven by the communication and information services area (see, e.g., Altman, Orda and Shimkin (2000) , Altman and Kushner (1999) Carpenter and Nichols (2002) , Gibbens and Kelly (1999) and the references therein). The prism through which we view the system and its performance focuses on the users-level or overall demand-level rather than data flows or packets (similar to the study of Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis (2000) ). The notion of service differentiation is of course quite ubiquitous in operations management and service operations. Two specific application areas that are akin to the one studied here include call-centers that process "VIP" and "regular" customers (see, e.g, the recent survey by Gans, Koole and Mandelbaum (2003) ), and rental systems that serve customers with reservations as well as "walk-ins" (see, e.g., Savin, Cohen, Gans and Katalan (2002) ). In the former, users experience congestion by waiting in a queue until agents become available, while in the latter congestion appears in the form of blocking when there is no remaining capacity. For a recent discussion of service grades, customer types and scheduling rules in a production system modelled as a multi-class single-server queue, see Van Mieghem (2000) .
Our view of the service provider as having complete knowledge of the user (or demand function) characteristics is dubbed "full information" in Van Mieghem (2000) . In this setting, as argued in Van Mieghem (2000) , the assumption that services are non-substitutable is essentially not restrictive, as the system manager can always select not to serve customers that select the "wrong" class.
A similar model to the one we pursue in the current paper, dealing with "incomplete information," substitutable services, and users that have a choice of service level is discussed in Maglaras and Zeevi (2003b) . Finally, McGill and van Ryzin (1999) provide a recent overview of revenue management that is tangentially related to our work.
A stream of recent research has emphasized the pivotal role played by diffusion limits as a means to analyze large scale service systems. In this context, a particularly useful framework is the many-server heavy-traffic limits pioneered by Halfin and Whitt (1981) . The interest in the HalfinWhitt regime largely stems from its ability to succinctly summarize and elucidate natural statistical economies scale that are present in many large capacity service system. In particular, Whitt (1992) and Garnett, Mandelbaum and Reiman (2002) argue that this regime is a desirable operating point for certain large scale service operations. In Maglaras and Zeevi (2003a) the Halfin-Whitt regime is optimal from an economic optimization standpoint in a system that only offers BE-type service. In the current paper the Halfin-Whitt heavy-traffic regime is also seen to be the outcome of economic optimization, viz, fluid-optimal prices induce this type of behavior. For some recent applications and extensions of the Halfin-Whitt results see Whitt (1992) , Fleming, Stolyar and Simon (1994) , Das and Srikant (2000) , Garnett et al. (2002) , Puhalskii and Reiman (2000) . In the context of call centers, Armony and Maglaras (2004b) and Whitt (2004) study the equilibrium behavior of large capacity systems based on the Halfin-Whitt asymptotics, while Whitt (1999) and Armony and Maglaras (2004a) study the effect of real-time congestion notification; the latter uses HalfinWhitt type diffusion limits. Motivated by the skills-based routing problem in call centers, both Atar, Mandelbaum and Reiman (2002) and Harrison and Zeevi (2004) study dynamic scheduling problems in multi-class many-server systems. (For recent surveys of these and other issues related to call center design see Gans et al. (2003) and Whitt (2002) .)
Model Formulation and Design Objectives
Our stylized system model attempts to capture four important features of the physical system: common and finite processing capacity, lack of resource pooling when the system is under-utilized, differentiated services, and the capability to share processing resources in the Best-effort class.
The system model. The service system is endowed with a finite processing capacity C used to support two non-substitutable services which will also be referred to as classes: "guaranteed-rate" (G) service will be denoted as class 1, and a "best-effort" type service will be denoted as class 2.
Hereafter, various quantities will be tagged with subscripts 1 and 2 to denote the two respective classes. Users requesting class i service arrive to the system according to a Poisson process with rate λ i , and have independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) service requirements that are exponentially distributed with rate µ i . Note that the two services are linked through the common capacity constraint. The precise details and dynamics of the two service classes are as follows:
(i) Guaranteed-rate (G) service: Let Q 1 (t) denote the number of G-users in the system at time t and assume, for simplicity, that C is integer valued. Users of this service that are admitted into the system always receive one unit of processing capacity. Since the system has finite capacity, it will not always be possible to deliver this guarantee and thus the service provider will need to exercise some form of admission control. This will be denoted by the non-decreasing process U = (U (t) : t ≥ 0), where U (t) counts the cumulative number of such connection requests that have been blocked (i.e., rejected) up to time t > 0, with U (0) = 0. We will assume that the admission control U is Markovian, that is, the decision on whether to admit a G-user arriving at time t depends only on the number of users of each type currently connected to the system. Note that the guaranteed rate of service offered to these users implies that Q 1 (t) ≤ C for all times t.
(ii) Best-effort (BE) service: BE-users are always admitted into the system and the service provider does not exercise any form of admission control in this service class. When there is sufficient capacity in the system, BE-users receive a nominal allocation of one unit of processing capacity, and otherwise they share available capacity in an egalitarian manner resulting in a degraded processing rate. Specifically, the rate allocated to BE-users at time t is BE service rate = 1
where Q 2 (t) denotes the number of best-effort users in the system at time t. When Q 1 (t) = C, BE-users temporarily do not receive service but remain connected to the system.
Despite the processor sharing characteristic, it can be verified that the dynamics of the process (Q 2 (t) : t ≥ 0) are identical to that of an M/M/C(t)/∞ system, where the capacity C(t) = C − Q 1 (t) ≥ 0 is a stochastic process modulated by the number of G-users in the system. The dynamics of (Q 1 (t) : t ≥ 0) depend on the admission control U that is yet to be specified.
Economic structure and demand model. We assume that the service provider charges a fixed connection fee p i > 0 for each class i user accessing the system. The BE-users perceive the disutility associated with rate degradation through the excess delay it induces relative to the nominal sojourn time based on a unit rate allocation. 1 A proxy for this excess delay is inversely proportional to the rate degradation, i.e.,
We note that in large capacity systems D(t)/µ 2 is an asymptotically accurate estimate of the actual excess delay due to a pathwise version of Little's law. To facilitate mathematical analysis, we will take the excess delay to be
, where x∨y := max{x, y}.
This ensures that the excess delay is finite almost surely. (As will be evident in what follows, this assumption does not restrict the generality of the analysis in any meaningful manner.)
We assume an additive linear delay cost for BE-users, which is q > 0 per unit of time of excess delay; the subscript 2 is dropped from D and q since these quantities are only relevant for the BE service class. Thus, the cost of joining the system for G-users is given by the price, p 1 , while for BE-users this cost is given by p 2 + q µ 2 ED, where ED is the expected steady-state delay (the precise notion of this steady-state is explained below). As a matter of convention, we will denote steady-state quantities with either an '∞' as their time argument or simply by omitting the time 1 Information/communication service providers often quote a service rate to users, and this is often accompanied by a table that translates rates into waiting times for various job sizes (that the system does not know a priori).
argument altogether when no confusion arises, e.g., D := D(∞). The arrival rate in each class is then λ 1 (p 1 ) for G-users and λ 2 (p 2 + (q/µ 2 )ED) for BE-users, where λ i (·) are the respective demand functions for each class of service. Note that the rate of Guser connection requests, λ 1 (p 1 ), does not depend on the admission control U , but that a fraction of λ 1 (p 1 ) will be denied admission in accordance to the control U (t). Note that a fraction of the G-user connection request rate, λ 1 (p 1 ), will be denied admission in accordance to the control U (t), but that λ i (p 1 ) itself does not depend on U . The long-run blocking probability for such users is
which is for now assumed to exist (this is later proved to be the case under a specific admission policy). The demand functions are assumed to be convex, decreasing, continuously differentiable, and such that λ i (x) → 0 as x → ∞, for i = 1, 2. The inverse demand function will be denoted
With slight abuse of notation, we will denote the vector of realized arrival rates using the same notation as the demand functions only omitting the argument, i.e., λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 ). Finally, put Λ i := max x λ i (x), the maximum demand or market potential for each type of service, respectively, which is assumed to be finite. This allows us to normalize the demand functions, writing, for example, the arrival rate into each class as
whereλ i (·) is the normalized demand function taking values in the unit interval.
Equilibrium formulation. As hinted above, we will focus our attention on the equilibrium steady-state behavior of the system. To be precise, we say that for some price vector p = (p 1 , p 2 ) and control U the system admits a unique equilibrium if there exists a unique steady-state probability distribution for the process ((Q 1 (t), Q 2 (t)) : t ≥ 0), such that the expected delay in class 2 when taken w.r.t. to this distribution, ED, induces a time homogenous vector of external arrival rates
and these arrival rates together with the steady-state blocking probability defined above are, in turn, consistent with the aforementioned steady-state distribution. For now we will assume that an equilibrium exists and proceed to pose an optimization problem in terms of the pricing and admission control decisions. We will return to this issue in Sections 3 and 4 where we propose a specific admission control policy for which we show that there exists a unique equilibrium. Section 8 will contrast this model with one where state-dependent information is announced to the users.
Design objectives. The economic optimization problem faced by the service provider is to maximize the equilibrium revenue rate generated by the system. This optimum is given by
where the optimization is carried out under the equilibrium distribution. Implicit in this expression is the dependence of the congestion effects for G and BE users, namely b(U ) and ED, on the admission control U . This formulation assumes that the service provider has full information on the user characteristics and induced demand functions summarized in the five-tuple (q, µ 1 , µ 2 , Λ 1 , Λ 2 ) and the two normalized demand functionsλ i (·), i = 1, 2. The design variables in the above optimization problem are the prices levied on each provisioned service and the admission control policy U . Subsequently, in Section 8 we consider the additional decision of selecting the mechanism by which congestion is "fed-back" to the users (i.e., static vs. dynamic information). In what follows, it will be useful to consider a version of the maximization problem stated above where the revenue rates are considered as functions of λ rather than price, p. In particular, put
where these functions are assumed to be continuously differentiable, strictly concave and increasing in the λ i 's. This formulation, as well as the assumptions accompanying it, are quite standard in the revenue management literature; see, e.g, Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) .
Discussion of the modeling assumptions. The model we propose assumes that when the system is under-utilized, spare capacity cannot be redistributed to the users currently in the system;
i.e., there is no resource pooling. The reason for this assumption is that most service systems are limited by a maximum processing rate. In the context of communication and information services this is typically due to restricted uploaded and downloaded rates and limited efficiency in executing tasks in parallel. In terms of probabilistic primitives the assumption regarding the Poisson arrival streams is not restrictive, however the exponential distribution of the service times is required for tractability. Note that the expression in (2) implicitly assumes that demand for BE-type service is affected by users assessing their congestion cost based on their average service time, as opposed to the use of their actual (random) service requirement. This follows the modeling framework introduced by Mendelson and Whang (1990) , and is reasonable in applications where the user does not know a priori the precise amount of service that he/she will request. In terms of congestion cost, we note that the hierarchical solution approach we propose applies also in the case where delay costs are convex increasing as in Van Mieghem (2000) . Finally, our system model assumes that the two service classes are non-substitutable and users cannot select between them upon accessing the system. As pointed out in Van Mieghem (2000), when the service provider has full information on the user characteristics (demand functions) one could allow users a choice of QoS level, then simply penalize users that select the "incorrect" class.
Deterministic Analysis
The first step in our analysis is to formulate and solve a deterministic relaxation of the design problem given in (3). To this end, we introduce two new design variables, b and d; the former plays the role of the blocking probability for G-users, and the latter plays the role of the steady-state excess delay suffered by the BE-users. This informal description is meant to indicate the logic behind the deterministic relaxation, and how it is derived from the original optimization problem (3). This deterministic problem is given by
Note that the objective function is the "same" as the one in (3), and the constraint linking the
is the stability condition that was implicitly satisfied in the stochastic system of the previous section due to blocking of G-users and the regulation of the BE demand via the equilibrium congestion term ED. Treating b, d as optimization variables is of course a relaxation of the original problem, and therefore the value of the optimization problem (5) provides an upper bound on the optimal revenue rate for the stochastic system R * .
The first observation about the solution to this optimization problem is that in terms of revenue rate maximization it is optimal to never block G-users and never delay BE-users, i.e.,b = 0 and d = 0, where the overbar notation denotes the solution of the deterministic planning problem. This is proved by contradiction. Suppose that (p 1 , p 2 , b, d) is optimal with b > 0. It is easy to see that the service provider can raise p 1 to p ′ 1 such that λ 1 (p ′ 1 ) = λ 1 (p 1 )(1 − b) and extract higher revenues while consuming the same capacity per unit time, which contradicts the optimality of (p 1 , p 2 , b, d).
Similarly, one can show that it is never optimal to have BE-users suffer a positive excess delay.
To characterize the optimal prices and associated demand rates for (5) we will assume that the system capacity is scarce in the following sense. Let p * i = argmax p≥0 pλ i (p) denote the unconstrained revenue maximizing price for service class i. We will require that
i.e., the unconstrained revenue maximizing demand rates consume at least as much capacity as C.
This can be motivated by considering a higher-level profit maximization problem that incorporates a convex increasing cost of capacity per unit time, denoted by H(C), in which case it is easy to show that the maximum profit rate
when the capacity constraint is binding.
Given the discussion above, we can now focus our attention on (5) with b = d = 0. Under the assumptions imposed on the primitives, it is readily seen that the resulting two variable optimization problem involves maximizing a (strictly) concave function over a convex set. We also assume that the solution of this deterministic problem is such that it is profitable to offer both service classes so that the problem does not degenerate to one involving only a single class. Analysis of the Lagrangean associated with (5), with b, d set to zero, leads to a precise condition that ensures that the optimum in (5) is achieved at an interior point of the set of feasible rates. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Assume that (6) holds and letp 1 ,p 2 ,b,d denote the maximizer of the deterministic optimization problem (5). Then,b = 0 andd = 0, andp 1 ,p 2 lead to full resource utilization, i.e.,
, then then it is optimal to offer both services, i.e., λ(
The fluid-optimal demand rates associated with the solution of (5) are computed through the demand functions,
Proposed policy. The next step is to articulate a pricing and admission control policy for the original system based on the solution of the deterministic relaxation given above. The pricing policy will be to set the per-access fees for service classes 1 and 2 equal top 1 andp 2 , respectively.
In terms of admission control decisions, the solution to (5) is not very helpful as it prescribes no blocking and no delay for G and BE users, respectively. Under the pricing structure proposed above, however, it is natural to consider an admission policy that gives "priority" to G-users provided that µ 1p1 ≥ µ 2p2 , and to BE-users otherwise. That is, the system gives priority to the class that generates higher revenue per unit of capacity per unit time. Direct analysis of the first order optimality conditions of (5) yield that µ 1p1 ≥ µ 2p2 is equivalent tō
where
In general, this only provides an implicit condition on the underlying primitives that gives rise to a more "expensive" G-class. This can be further simplified if one assumes a particular form for the demand functions. For example, in the context of linear demand models, where for any price p the demand λ i (p) = Λ i − α i p, this reduces to the condition
In the remainder of the paper we will assume that µ 1p1 ≥ µ 2p2 , and thus that G-users receive higher priority. Denoting this policy byŪ , we have thatŪ (t) only increases (and a G-user is denied admission) at times where upon arrival of a G-user request Q 1 (t) = C, i.e., the entire capacity is already utilized by high-priority users. Note that in this case (Q 1 (t), t ≥ 0) has the same dynamics as the number-in-system process in an M/M/C/C system. For future purposes, it will be convenient to denote the fluid-optimal revenues, i.e., the value of the deterministic optimization problem (5), as a function of the fluid-optimal prices,
and note that by construction this serves as an upper bound for the revenue rate in the underlying stochastic system, i.e., R * ≤R(p 1 ,p 2 ). Finally, the relative workload contributions of each service class are defined by
and κ 1 + κ 2 = 1. Thus, the κ's represent the fluid-scale fractions of load that emanate from each service class.
System Behavior Under the Deterministic Solution
We now study the performance of the system under the policy extracted from the fluid relaxation, taking into account the effect of stochastic variability and congestion.
Equilibrium analysis under the proposed policy
The first step is to establish that under the policy proposed above there exists a unique equilibrium operating regime. This is addressed in the next two propositions. First, consider a system where the BE-user class is not sensitive to delay, i.e., q = 0. (Alternatively, this is a system with no feedback signal.) The next proposition characterizes the stability region for this system, i.e., the set of input rates λ = (λ 1 , λ 2 ) such that the system admits a unique steady-state.
Proposition 2 For each capacity C > 0, and arrival vector λ > 0 such that
is the steady-state probability of blocking in an M/M/C/C queue with arrival rate λ 1 and service rate µ 1 .
Note that (Q 1 (t) : t ≥ 0) admits a unique stationary distribution for any arrival rate λ 1 since the number-in-system is bounded by C. If we assume that under the unique steady-state distribution, the expected delay, ED, is continuous in the BE-class arrival rate, λ 2 , then, for the system with feedback (q > 0), we have the following result.
Proposition 3 For each capacity C > 0, and price vector p ≥ 0, there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium.
The nature of the two-class system and the associated equilibrium formulation make it difficult to pursue a direct analysis of the Markov chain describing the system dynamics. This difficulty is exacerbated when the service rates for the two classes differ, i.e., when µ 1 = µ 2 . (This problem has been pointed out in many other studies; see, e.g, Davis (1966) and Williams (1980) .) With this in mind, we will first derive approximations to the system equilibrium behavior in the simpler case, where the service rates are identical. This provides a clean illustration of the main structural insights and key results. Subsequently, Section 6 will illustrate how these results extend to the case of non-identical service rates.
Preliminaries for asymptotic analysis
Our approach will rely on approximations which are accurate in large scale operations, i.e., when the market potential and the system capacity are both large. To derive these approximations, we will let the "scale" of the system grow as follows: for n = 1, 2, . . . and i = 1, 2 we set
[capacity grows proportionally to the market potential]
The second and third assumptions imply that the structure of the demand curve is preserved, while its magnitude is scaled up linearly. The proportionality factor,Λ = (Λ 1 ,Λ 2 ) are derived from the original system parameters by settingΛ i := Λ i /C, where Λ i is the potential demand for ith service class, and the system capacity is C. Note that in the case of linear costs of capacity, h(C) = h · C for some h > 0, the assumption that capacity and market potentials grow proportionally would be a consequence of the profit maximization objective that incorporates capacity costs; for an illustration of this argument in the single-class context see Maglaras and Zeevi (2003a) . Finally, we note that under the scalings given in (9) the fluid optimal pricesp i and the workload contributions κ i defined in the previous section are independent of n, while the fluid-optimal demand ratesλ n i grow proportionally to n. We use the superscript n to denote quantities that depend on the (growing) system capacity, e.g., ρ n denotes the system utilization, and the absence of such a superscript will indicate quantities that are independent of n. For two real-valued sequences a n , b n we write a n = o(b n ) if a n /b n → 0 as n → ∞. Finally, for any differentiable function f : R → R, f ′ will denote its derivative.
Main results
System equilibrium characterization. Our first result characterizes the system equilibrium. In particular, it asserts that the fluid optimal-prices induce "high" resource utilization (heavy-traffic) and yet the service quality achieved is high.
Theorem 1 (Equilibrium characterization) Suppose that µ 1 = µ 2 = µ, the conditions of Proposition 1 hold, and assume that demand (λ n ) and capacity (C n ) grow large as in (9) as n → ∞.
Consider the sequence of steady-state utilizations ρ n , delays D n , and queue lengths Q n 1 , Q n 2 obtained in equilibrium for each n. Then, i.) system utilization:
ii.) BE-class delay:
iii.) G-class blocking:
iv.) system congestion:
as n → ∞. Furthermore, the parameter γ that characterizes the asymptotic approximations in i) to iv) above can be explicitly computed as the unique solution of the following equation
where d(γ) is given by
Here κ 2 is the workload contribution associated with the BE-users for the fluid price vectorp, ν(γ) := κ 2 γd(γ), and Φ(·), φ(·) denote the standard Normal cumulative distribution function and its density, respectively.
Intuition and "proof sketch." The essence of the equilibrium analysis hinges on the delay process D. To this end, the delay experienced by the BE-class (see (1)) satisfies
where '≈' is used to denote equality up to lower order terms in n. Now, when the mean service requirements are identical in the two classes and neglecting the blocking of G-users, the numberin-system process, Q n 1 (t) + Q n 2 (t), has identical dynamics to the number-in-system process in an M/M/n queue. In particular, (Q n 1 (t) + Q n 2 (t) − n) + is then simply the queue length at time t ≥ 0, and the steady-state mean is
where Q n i := Q n i (∞). When ρ n = 1 − γ/ √ n for some γ > 0, we have that
and lim n→∞ P(Q n 1 + Q n 2 ≥ n) = ν(γ) = φ(γ)/(γΦ(γ) + φ(γ)) (see, e.g., Halfin and Whitt (1981, Proposition 1) ). On the other hand, the process Q n 1 is simply the number-in-system in an M/M/n/n queue with λ n 1 = κ 1 nµ, which follows from (8). (Recall that κ 1 , κ 2 are the relative workload contributions from each class of service.) Consequently, EQ n 1 ≈ κ 1 n, and n − Q n 1 ≈ κ 2 n. Combining these observations, we conclude that ED n ≈ d(γ)/ √ n. Since the blocking probability for the Gclass is small, it follows that the utilization is essentially dictated by the above congestion term, in particular, ρ ≈ 1 − γ/ √ n. Finally, by taking a Taylor expansion of the demand function for the BE-class,λ 2 (·), one obtains the equilibrium equation (10). While this sketch captures some of the intuition that underlies the actual proof, it is also somewhat misleading. In particular, due to blocking effects a rigorous analysis of the two-class system hinges on diffusion limits.
Implications: performance of the fluid-optimal prices. Theorem 1 suggests that the revenues generated under the fluid-optimal prices ought to be "close" to optimal, due to the "small" degradation attributed to stochastic fluctuations. To turn this into a rigorous statement, let us first introduce the following notation. Let
denote the revenue rate achieved under any feasible price pair (p 1 , p 2 ) and admission control U in equilibrium, which is assumed to exist, and let
denote the optimal revenue for a system with capacity C n = n. Under this notation, R n (p 1 ,p 2 ,Ū ) denotes the equilibrium revenue rate under the policy extracted through the fluid relaxation of Section 3. Also, recall thatR(p 1 ,p 2 ) is the value of the deterministic optimization problem, i.e., the fluid revenue rate generated by the fluid-optimal pricesp 1 ,p 2 , and letR n = nR(p 1 ,p 2 ) denote the optimal revenue extracted in (5) when λ i (·) is replaced by λ n i (·) and C n = n.
Theorem 2 (Asymptotic optimality of the deterministic solution) Under the assumptions of Theorem 1,p 1 ,p 2 ,Ū are asymptotically optimal in the sense that
as n → ∞, where α > 0 is a function ofp 1 ,p 2 . Moreover, R n (p 1 ,p 2 ,Ū )/R n → 1 as n → ∞.
The above result is reminiscent of the one derived by Gallego and van Ryzin (1994) who established "near optimality" of static, fluid-based, pricing rules. A similar result was also derived by Paschalidis and Tsitsiklis (2000) for a multiclass loss model. While the problem formulation, set up and analysis are quite different, these results are driven by aggregation effects that lead to reduced variability, namely, as the problem scales up, variability only scales as a square-root of the size of the problem. The asymptotic optimality property described above is in the "first order" sense (or fluid scale sense) insofar as it does not yield the best possible constant α. To that end, the effects of the admission control policy are seen to be second order, i.e., are captured in the magnitude of α. In section 7 we will describe a refinement to the fluid-optimal prices that optimizes second order performance given the admission policy derived from the fluid relaxations.
The case where BE service gets priority. As mentioned earlier, one could also consider the situation where the BE-class generates higher revenues per unit of capacity per unit time, and thus receives higher priority from the service provider. In this case, G-users are blocked whenever BE-users suffer rate degradation, and the brunt of congestion is borne by the G-users.
The main results we obtained in this section could be derived in this setting as well, and the main structural conclusions should continue to hold (essentially interchanging the two service classes).
That is, having the high priority BE-class suffering exponentially small congestion, the G-class being blocked with probability proportional to γ/ √ n, and the overall system utilization being again ρ n ≈ 1 − γ/ √ n. We will not attempt to rigorously justify these statements, since this would necessitate going well beyond the space limitations of the current paper.
Qualitative Insights and Accuracy of the Approximations
The heavy-traffic regime. The operational regime where capacity (C) is large and "matches" demand in a manner that the system probability of congestion is moderate, was first investigated by Halfin and Whitt (1981) in their seminal paper on many-server heavy-traffic limits in the context of the M/M/n queue. As observed in the sequel study by Whitt (1992) , large capacity systems that operate in high utilization exhibit statistical economies of scale, manifested as stochastic fluctuations which are of order square root the "size" of the system. These economies of scale are the primary reason for the high quality of service that prevails in spite of high utilization. Theorem 1 establishes that the fluid-optimal prices, derived on the basis of a deterministic analysis, lead the system to operate in the so-called Halfin-Whitt regime.
Using Theorem 1 to approximate the performance of a given system. The asymptotic result in Theorem 1 suggests how one can approximate the performance of a system with fixed and finite capacity C. In particular, one first uses the problem primitives (namely, parameters of the demand curveλ(·), and the market potential Λ) to solve the deterministic problem in Section 3, arriving at the fluid-optimal pricesp 1 ,p 2 . Then, one proceeds to solve (10), deriving the equilibrium parameter γ and computing d(γ) given by (11) in Theorem 1. These limiting parameters are then used to approximate key performance measures which are affected by stochastic fluctuations: (i) the utilization is ρ ≈ 1 − γ/ √ C, and; (ii) the BE-delay is ED ≈ d(γ)/ √ C. Moreover, blocking effects in the high priority (G) class are indeed negligible relative to congestion-related effects in the BE-class. The numerical example that follows provides a concrete illustration of the use of Theorem 1 in approximating the behavior of a given system.
Accuracy of the deterministic analysis. The equilibrium operating point characterized in
Theorem 1 verifies, in hindsight, the accuracy of the deterministic analysis. In particular, the latter assumes zero delays and blocking effects, deducing that the system operates in 100% utilization, while the former asserts that stochastic effects perturb the fluid operating point by order 1/ √ C, as spelled out in statements (i) and (ii) in the previous paragraph. Moreover, Theorem 2 establishes that the revenues generated by the fluid-optimal prices are near optimal, when capacity (C) and market potential (Λ) are both large.
A numerical illustration. Throughout the paper we use the following sample problem as a running example, with the goal of illustrating numerically how the analytical results describe the structural behavior of the system. We assume a linear demand relationship for both services, of the form
for appropriate parameters Λ i , α i for i = 1, 2. The α i 's are the price sensitivity parameters of the two demand models. Letλ i denote the nominal demand rates for each service class computed through the deterministic revenue maximization problem (5), letp i be the corresponding prices, and let κ i be the associated relative workload contributions. Pursuing further the analysis presented in Section 3, the first order optimality conditions for (5) are (Λ i − 2λ i )/α i = ν/µ i , where ν is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the capacity constraint, which leads to the solution
The fluid prices are then given byp i = (Λ i −λ i )/α i . Figure 1 shows the dependence of the equilibrium congestion term ED n and the corresponding traffic intensity ρ n as we vary the system capacity n. The demand model parameters are chosen so that for n = 50, 100, . . . , 450, Λ n 1 = 1.5 · n, α n 1 = n/10, Λ n 2 = 2 · n, α n 2 = n/5, µ 1 = µ 2 = 1, q = 1. (Under (5), κ i = .5 andp 1 = 10 andp 2 = 7.50, independent of n.) These results highlight the high accuracy of the proposed asymptotic approximations when compared to the "exact" results based on exhaustive simulation. For the latter, we simulate five sample paths of 2,000,000 events each at different values of d = ED n , until the sample estimate ED n is in agreement with the hypothesized parameter d and the system is in equilibrium; henceforth, quantities obtained via simulation will be tagged with aˆ. Moreover, the structural properties given in Theorem 1 appear to be in force even for systems of moderate capacity. Specifically, the two figures illustrate that the expected delay suffered by the BE-users in equilibrium decays like d(γ)/ √ n, and the equilibrium traffic intensity The closed-form asymptotic approximations given in Theorem 1 can be used in order to study the sensitivity of system performance to various model parameters such as (q, α 1 , α 2 ). Table 1 reports results obtained via both the asymptotic approximations and exhaustive simulation for a set of representative examples. The parameters used to construct this table are: n = 100, µ 1 = µ 2 = 1, Λ 1 = 150, and Λ 2 = 200. As expected, an increase in the delay sensitivity parameter q results in a decrease in the equilibrium delay for the BE users and moreover the arrival rate into the BE service class and the overall traffic intensity also decrease. These effects are "second order" since they depend on the congestion cost which, in turn, behaves like 1/ √ C. Similarly, as the price sensitivity parameter for G service increases (this changes the revenue function for this class), the relative workload contributions extracted from the deterministic optimization problem (5) change, and the overall revenue rate decreases; both changes affect the first order behavior of the system by changing the κ i 's that define how nominal capacity is split between the two classes. In all five examples, the revenue rate computed via simulation was very close to the one predicted via the asymptotic approximations, which is given by
Moreover, both values were close toR, obtained from the deterministic optimization problem (5).
(1,10,20 Table 1 : Sensitivity of the equilibrium behavior (expected delay, system utilization and revenue rate generated) w.r.t. (q, α 1 , α 2 ), in a a system with capacity C = 100 operating under the fluidoptimal prices. The expected delay, system utilization and resulting revenue rate ED, ρ and R are computed using the asymptotic expressions, while ED,ρ, andR are simulation-based estimates.R denotes the upper bound on the optimal revenues derived from the deterministic analysis, and % relative error are defined as (ED − ED)/ED × 100 etc.
The Case of Non-identical Service Rates
This section describes an approach that allows us to extend our previous results to the case of non-identical service rates (i.e., µ 1 = µ 2 ). As noted in Section 4, the key element in characterizing the equilibrium is the delay process, D n , which, in turn, is essentially characterized by the numberin-system process, Q n 1 + Q n 2 . The "intuition and proof sketch" that followed Theorem 1 suggests that when the service rates are identical, the number-in-system process has a simple Markovian structure for all n, and its steady-state distribution is simple to characterize. In contrast, when the service rates are not identical, the number-in-system process is not Markovian, and it is no longer simple to characterize its steady-state distribution. While this observation places an obstacle, at least as far as analysis is concerned, the scaling relations of Theorem 1 can be expected to hold true on the basis of diffusion approximations described in Appendix A.
For the purposes of performance analysis, i.e., in order to approximate the system equilibrium behavior, we exploit the following simple observation: given a system with different service rates, we can construct an approximating system that has the same service rates, adjusting arrival rates so as to capture the effect of the difference in the µ i 's. Since this system has equal service rates, it is amenable to the analysis of Section 4. We now provide a skeleton of the approach culminating in an approximation for ED n .
Consider a system with capacity C, service rates µ 1 , µ 2 and arrival rates λ i = Cκ i µ i − γ i √ Cµ i , for some appropriate parameters γ i such that γ 1 + γ 2 > 0; the latter is equivalent to ρ < 1. Note that for any arrival rates λ 1 , λ 2 and given values κ 1 , κ 2 (extracted from (8)), one can always rewrite the λ i 's in the form given above. For our system γ 1 = 0 and
the latter follows from the fact that ED ≈ d(γ)/ √ C. Our goal is to approximate ED, and thus characterize the behavior of the underlying system.
The perturbation approximation. Defineμ = (µ 1 + µ 2 )/2, and rewrite the service rates as "small" perturbations around that common valueμ, viz,
by settingγ i = γ i µ i /μ. Keeping ζ 1 , ζ 2 ,γ 1 ,γ 2 fixed, define a sequence of systems with
Note that by setting n = C we recover the parameters of the original system, (C, µ 1 , µ 2 , λ 1 , λ 2 ).
That is, we have embedded the original system in a the sequence of systems defined through (15), the limit of which is tractable since both µ n 1 , µ n 2 →μ as n → ∞, and where the difference between the original values µ 1 , µ 2 is captured via theγ i 's. (See Maglaras and Zeevi (2004, Theorem 2) for details.) Since there is only one value of µ appearing asymptotically, the sum process is now tractable and its steady-state behavior is essentially characterized through the total traffic intensity in the system given by
which can be rewritten in the form
In contrast, the original system with service rates µ 1 , µ 2 and arrival rates λ 1 , λ 2 had total traffic intensity 1 − (γ 1 + γ 2 )/ √ C; i.e., the approximating scheme eventually reduces to scaling the γ i 's by µ i /μ, respectively. Finally, using the results of Section 4 we can compute the congestion cost for the limit system that has same service rates as ED = d(γ), where d(·) is given in (11). Returning to our original system with γ 1 = 0 and
We note that the perturbation approximation pertains to a system that is announcing the true value of the steady-state delay and not the value derived through the perturbation approximation.
That is, the users are responding to the "right" information and not an approximation that is computed through the proposed perturbation approach.
The proposed approximation is quite accurate, as the following numerical study illustrates.
Figure 2 studies the equilibrium congestion cost suffered by the BE class as we vary the ratio between µ 2 /µ 1 . In particular, the congestion cost for the system with µ 1 = µ 2 is computed via simulation and then contrasted against the perturbation approximation which usesμ = (µ 1 +µ 2 )/2.
The demand model parameters were: n = 100, Λ n 1 = 150, α n 1 = 10, Λ n 2 = 200 · µ 2 , α n 2 = 20 · µ 2 2 , µ 1 = 1, µ 2 ∈ {1, 1.25, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 10}, q = 1 (Under (5), κ i = .5 for all parameter choices.). As is evident from this figure (as well as in other test cases studied), the perturbation approximation described above provides an accurate estimate of the congestion cost, and this accuracy degrades, as one would expect, when the ratio of the µ i 's increases. 
Optimizing Revenues: A Second Order Price Correction
The last three sections have studied the behavior and revenue performance of the fluid prices derived from the solution of the deterministic revenue maximization problem (5). A key insight is that under this pricing policy the system will naturally operate in heavy traffic with a low level of congestion in the BE service class, and the resulting revenue loss due to congestion will be moderate. The latter was captured through the second order term in Theorem 2. This section will apply the asymptotic results derived thus far to approximate the performance of a given system with capacity C that is assumed to be large, and proceed to optimize the second order revenue loss term by appropriately fine tuning the corresponding pricing decisions.
Specifically, for a system with large capacity C, the total load into the system ρ is of the form
, the BE congestion ED is of order
, and in equilibrium
κ 2 , and γ is defined via the equilibrium equation γ = β 2 q µ 2 d(γ). This leads to √ Cβ 2 µ 2 q µ 2 d(γ)p 2 in lost revenues due to congestion effects, which may be significant.
Refining the fluid-optimal price. Building on the scaling relations given in Theorems 1 and 2, we will consider a pricing rule that incorporates a second order price correction term of the form
Such prices do not affect the first order behavior of the system, while introducing a second order correction that affects the equilibrium behavior and the lost revenues due to congestion. Pricing rules of this form have been shown to be asymptotically optimal in Maglaras and Zeevi (2003a) for a single-class system offering BE type of service (under the additional assumption that the demand is elastic).
Under the pricing rule (17), and assuming that C is large, we have that
κ i , and γ is defined via the equilibrium equation
It is again easy to show that for any π 1 , π 2 ∈ R this expression has a unique solution γ > 0 that characterizes the system equilibrium. The system revenues under the pricing rule (17) are
where the '≈' notation implies equality to within lower order terms in C.
Optimizing revenue rates. Given (19) we can formulate a second order optimization problem that determines the price correction factors π i as follows:
subject to the equilibrium condition (18). This problem can be readily solved by searching over the π i 's and using the closed-form expression for d(γ) given in (11). For each value of the vector π, the above calculation requires the evaluation of the system equilibrium behavior. If the µ's are the same this reduces to finding the unique solution of (18). If the µ i 's are different, then the equilibrium equation is modified according to the perturbation approximation described earlier, by settingμ = (µ 1 + µ 2 )/2 and replacing µ 2 byμ and
In the context of this second-order analysis, one can also consider a system that offers qualityof-service (QoS) guarantees of the form ED ≤ δ, for some appropriate bound δ > 0. To incorporate these guarantees in an asymptotic sense on needs to add the constraint d(γ) ≤ δ √ C to the optimization problem posed above in terms of the second order price correction terms π 1 , π 2 .
Numerical results. We conclude this section with a set of numerical results that illustrate the effect of second order price corrections on system-wide revenues. To isolate the effect of the pricing changes we have kept the service rates (µ 1 , µ 2 ) equal. Given (19), it follows that the magnitude of the revenue improvement due to the second order price corrections is second order, i.e., it grows like the square-root of capacity. Table 2 focuses on the dependence of these refinements, in terms of their effect on pricing decisions and equilibrium revenues, on the demand and delay sensitivity parameters. All reported results were obtained via the proposed asymptotic approximations, since as illustrated in the previous sections these tend to be quite accurate. Specifically,
and R(p * ) := R(p * 1 , p * 2 ) were computed via (19) for π 1 = π 2 = 0 in the first case and the optimal π i 's obtained from (20) in the second.R(p) :=R(p 1 ,p 2 ) is the revenue rate obtained from the deterministic formulation (5). The system parameters were: C = 100, µ 1 = µ 2 = 1, Λ 1 = 150, and
A quick inspection of these results highlights that the absolute magnitude of the revenue improvements is modest. This is not surprising in light of the fact that the system is operating in a regime that is close to heavy traffic and is extracting almost maximum revenues (upper bounded byR(p 1 ,p 2 )). However, a more detailed look at the results illustrates that the (%) improvement in terms of the distance from the upper boundR(p) -this is computed as the change in revenues R(p * ) − R(p) over the sub-optimality gap under the fluid pricesR(p) − R(p) and is reported in the rightmost column of the table -can be significant.
Effects of Congestion Notification
This section considers a system that announces state-dependent congestion information for the BE (or low priority) service class and analyzes the economic implications of this design decision. Table 2 : Sensitivity w.r.t. model parameters (q, α 1 , α 2 ). The table shows the fluid-optimal pricē p, the second order corrected price p * , and the resulting revenues R(p) and R(p * ). The rightmost column displays the improvement (%) in the sub-optimality gap.
The model. The system announces the state-dependent congestion signal
, which is the excess delay defined in (1). Various quantities that are associated with this system will be tagged with a superscript d, mnemonic for "dynamic," reflecting the real-time nature of this congestion information. The BE-users evaluate the disutility associated with BE service using
in place of the steady-state expected congestion cost ED. The state-dependent congestion signal results in a system with state-dependent arrival rate parameters given by
Note that under the standing assumption that users do not act strategically in response to the firm's pricing and congestion notification strategy, this model no longer requires an equilibrium analysis.
System behavior under the deterministic solution. Following the scaling assumption given in (9), consider a system with capacity C n = n and potential demand Λ n i = nΛ i . As a starting point we will optimistically assume that the congestion suffered by the BE-class satisfies the scaling relations derived for the system with static information, and scales as
for some appropriate limit process D d (·) to be identified later. Here a n = o p (b n ) if a n /b n ⇒ 0 as n → ∞. The immediate consequence of this assumption is that under the fluid pricesp 1 ,p 2 the arrival rates in to the two service classes are of the form
. Note that λ n,d
2 (t) is now a stochastic process. The overall traffic intensity is
In the spirit of the results reported in the previous sections, it is natural to posit that Q n,d
i (t) can be expressed as
where the κ i 's were defined in (8), and the process (X n,d
Using the expression in (24), the congestion term can be approximated as follows
which is consistent with (22). To justify the heuristic approach taken above we need to establish that (24) is indeed correct by identifying a well-behaved limit for the process (X n,d
2 (t) : t ≥ 0). To this end, let (X n (t) : t ≥ 0) and (X(t) : t ≥ 0) be R m -valued continuous time stochastic processes with sample paths in the space of functions having right-continuous paths with left limits. Then, X n (·) ⇒ X(·) denotes weak convergence in this functional space with respect to the Skorohod topology; see, e.g., Billingsley (1968, §3) . (Since all limit processes in this paper have continuous sample paths, it suffices to consider the above convergence w.r.t. the uniform metric on compact sets [0, T ], with T < ∞.) The next proposition justifies the heuristic described above.
Proposition 4 Assume that demand (λ n ) and capacity (C n ) grow large as in (9) as n → ∞. If
where X d is the unique strong solution of the stochastic differential equation:
where W = (W (t) : t ≥ 0) is standard Brownian motion in R 2 . The infinitesimal drift is given by
the revenue rate at time t by R(p, D n,d (t)). Then, using the fact that
we get that
Finally, using the expected steady-state value ED d given in (31) one can approximate the expected revenue rate for that system via a non-rigorous interchange of limits as follows
Recall that the revenue rate for the system with static information can be approximated by
Thus,
The next theorem establishes that the above difference is strictly positive as n grows large.
Theorem 3 Suppose that µ 1 = µ 2 = µ, and let the conditions of Proposition 1 hold. Then,
That is, BE-users experience better quality-of-service when real-time congestion information is provided to them. This, in turn, implies that the mean arrival rate into class 2 is larger when real-time congestion information is announced, which leads to the increase in revenues. Using the result of the theorem, we infer that real-time congestion notification results in a gain of order √ n in terms of generated revenues.
Numerical results. Figure 3 depicts the increase in revenues and decrease in expected congestion cost that occur in a system with real-time congestion notification. (Note that the simulation of the system with real-time congestion information involves a Markov chain with state-dependent parameters, but does not require a calculation of an equilibrium operating point.) The model parameters were: n = {50, 100, . . . , 450}, Λ n 1 = 1.5 · n, α n 1 = n/10, Λ n 2 = 2 · n, α n 2 = n/5, µ 1 = µ 2 = 1, q = 1 (Under (5), κ i = .5 andp 1 = 10 andp 2 = 7.50, independent of n.). We make three observations about these plots. First, as shown in Theorem 3, real-time congestion information leads to an increase in expected revenues that is proportional to the square root of the capacity, which seems to agree with the results displayed in the figure. Second, the expected delay suffered by BE users in the system with real-time information is indeed smaller. Finally, the variability in the simulation estimates for the change in expected revenues is higher in comparison to other results because here we need to simulate two independent systems. Acknowledgments: The authors are grateful to the two referees, the associate editor and the area editor for their constructive comments and helpful suggestions. 
A Diffusion Limits: Background and Auxiliary Results
The following theorem, whose proof can be found in Maglaras and Zeevi (2004, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1), characterizes the limiting dynamics in a system with no congestion feedback signal, and assumes that the arrival rates into each class are of the form
for i = 1, 2, n = 1, 2, . . ., with γ i such that γ 1 + γ 2 > 0. The structural implications of this result underlie the proof of Theorem 1, as in that theorem it it shown that equilibrium arrival rates are exactly of the form assumed in the result below. As in the main text, let X n i (·) := n −1/2 (Q n i (·)−κ i n) and X n (·) = (X n 1 (·), X n 2 (·)) and '⇒' denotes weak convergence in the space of functions which are right-continuous with left-limits, with respect to the Skorohod topology; see Billingsley (1968, §3) .
Theorem 4 (Maglaras and Zeevi, 2002) Assume that the arrival rates are of the form λ n i = κ i µ i n − γ i µ i √ n + o( √ n), for i = 1, 2, n = 1, 2, . . ., with γ i such that γ 1 + γ 2 > 0. Suppose that X n (0) ⇒ ξ for some ξ ∈ R 2 . Then, X n (·) ⇒ X(·) as n → ∞, where X is a diffusion process.
Specifically, X is the unique strong solution of the following stochastic differential equation:
where W = (W (t) : t ≥ 0) is standard Brownian motion in R 2 , the infinitesimal drift function b i (·)
for the i'th component is
and Σ := diag(σ 1 , σ 2 ), with σ 2 i = 2µ i κ i . Moreover, X admits a unique stationary distribution and
The infinitesimal drift in (37) has an intuitive interpretation: the limit process for the G-users, 
B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2: The proof relies on a relatively straightforward sample path argument imitating the construction in Loynes (1962) ; details are omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3: Using a stochastic ordering argument one can verify that the expected delay ED(λ 1 , λ 2 ), considered as an explicit function of the arrival rates, is monotonically increasing in λ 2 . In what follows we let d denote ED(λ 1 , λ 2 ). Note that
The equilibrium regime can be defined via the solution d * of the set of equations
where ED(d * ) denoted the steady state expected waiting time for class 2 service when the arrival rates into classes 1 and 2 are λ 1 and λ 2 (p 2 + i.e., h(d) does not switch sign at a point of discontinuity.)
Proof of Theorem 1: We first prove statement (iii) and then statements (i),(ii) and (iv).
Step 1. Proof of (iii). Note that the arrival rate into class 1, namely the G-users, is given by
Since the number of G-users in the system, Q n 1 , follows an M/M/n/n queue, its steady-state is
where a n := λ n 1 /µ = κ 1 n, by definition of κ 1 . Let Z n be a r.v. distributed Poisson with mean a n . Then, multiplying numerator and denominator in (38) by exp(−a n ) we can express the steady-state
The following auxiliary result gives an upper bound on the tail of a Poisson r.v.
Lemma 1 For any ǫ ∈ (0, 1 − κ 1 ) we have that
for n = 1, 2, . . .
Thus, P(0 ≤ Z n ≤ n) → 1 as n → ∞. To get a bound on the blocking probability, all we need is to bound the probability that Z n exceeds n. But, Lemma 1 yields exactly the bound asserted in (iii) in the theorem. Finally, we note that the above arguments imply that Q n 1 /n ⇒ κ 1 , as n → ∞. To see why this is true, fix ǫ > 0 and note that
as n → ∞, since (Z n − a n )/ √ a n ⇒ N (0, 1) by the central limit theorem for a Poisson r.v.
Step 2. In the sequel we will make use of a fictitious system to upper bound various system processes. This is a system without blocking, where a G-user arriving when Q n 1 (t) = n is allowed to join a queue and wait until the first serviced G-user in the system departs. to be served by the first available idle server. We will denote the associated processes byQ n i (·), and note that
, and that the dynamics ofQ n 1 (·) +Q n 2 (·) are that of an M/M/n queue. For this system, if ρ n < 1, then
This follows from standard formulas for the steady-state distribution of an M/M/N queue, see, e.g., Halfin and Whitt (1981) . Moreover, observe thatQ n 1 (·) +Q n 2 (·) ≥ Q n 1 (·) + Q n 2 (·) and n − Q n 1 (·) ≥ n −Q n 1 (·); i.e., this fictitious system provides a pointwise upper (lower) bound for the dynamics of the number-in-system (available capacity for BE users) in the original system.
Step 3. We now turn our attention to the proof of (i),(ii) and (iv). The BE-users' delay is
as j → ∞, where c > 0, and for simplicity, let this subsequence also be indexed by n. Then,
Using the system defined in Step 2 for ρ n < 1 and using (40) we get that
as n → ∞, where the last step follows from (Halfin and Whitt 1981 , Proposition 1) that asserts that in an M/M/n system with √ n(1 − ρ n ) → ∞, P(Q n 1 +Q n 2 ≥ n) → 0. Hence, we have a contradiction and it must be that d n → 0 as n → ∞.
Step 4. To get the convergence rate of d n , note that using a Taylor expansion for λ 2 (·) we
and since Λ n = nΛ, we have that
The next lemma studies the behavior of a system without feedback in this regime. (Its proof is relegated to the end of this appendix.)
Lemma 2 Consider the two-class system that operates without feedback, and with arrival rates set to be λ n 1 = κ 1 µn and λ n 2 = κ 2 µn − µγ √ n. Then,
where d(γ) was given in (11) and ν(γ) := κ 2 γd(γ).
That is, for a system where
To establish the equilibrium relation, (10), that holds for a system with feedback operating in the Halfin-Whitt regime, it suffices to consider the second order expansion for λ n , the total arrival rate into the system given by
Dividing through by nµ and equating second order terms we obtain the equilibrium condition 
, and shows that h is continuous and increasing in (0, ∞), lim γ→0 h(γ) < 0, and
To complete the proof it remains to rule out the cases √ nd n → 0 and √ nd n → ∞. To this end, suppose that √ nd n → 0, in which case √ n(1 − ρ n ) → 0. Observe from (41) and (11) that if we let γ ↓ 0, then d(γ) ↑ ∞, which contradicts the assumption that √ nd n → 0. Similarly, suppose (41) and (11) we get that as γ ↑ ∞, then d(γ) ↓ 0, which contradicts the assumption that √ nd n → ∞. Consequently, it must be that Proof of Theorem 2: First, recall that by construction of the deterministic relaxation problem in (5), R n * ≤R n for all n. By Theorem 1 and Lemma 1, ED n = d/ √ n + o(1/ √ n) and P(Q n 1 < n) ≤ C 1 exp(−C 2 n) for sufficiently large n and constants C 1 , C 2 > 0. Thus, we can take a Taylor series expansion of the total revenue generated by the fluid-optimal prices
as n → ∞, using results (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 1. Thus,
as n → ∞ for some α > 0. Since R n * ≤R n for sufficiently large n, the proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 4:
We will first express D n,d (·) in terms of the X n,d
i (·)'s, and subsequently obtain the infinitesimal drift for the Q n,d i (·) and X n,d i (·) processes, respectively. Then, we will appeal to the proof techniques that underlie Theorem 4 to establish that X n,d (·) ⇒ X d (·).
Using (25) we can rewrite D n,d (t) as
Suppose that Q n,d (t) = q n for some q n ∈ S n = {(q n 1 , q n 2 ) : q n 1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}, q n 2 ∈ {0, 1, . . .}}. Also, let x n = (q n − κn)/ √ n such that from (25) X n,d (t) = x n . The congestion signal at time t will be D n,d (q n ) = (q n 1 + q n 2 − n) + n − q n 1 = 1 √ n (x n 1 + x n 2 ) + κ 2 − x n 1 / √ n .
The arrival rates into the two service classes are given below λ n,d
1 (q n ) = κ 1 nµ 1 if q n 1 < n and λ n,d
1 (q n ) = 0 otherwise, and λ n,d
2 (q n ) = κ 2 nµ 2 − √ nβ 2 µ 2 q µ 2 κ 2
With some of abuse of notation we will also refer to D n,d (q n ) and λ n,d
i (q n ) by D n,d (x n ) and λ n,d
i (x n ), respectively. Under the Markovian dynamics of our system, we have that for any initial state q n = (q n 1 , q n 2 ) ∈ S n and δt > 0, the infinitesimal drift rates for each class are given by
as δt ↓ 0. Similarly, the infinitesimal variance for each class is
Finally, E [(Q n 1 (t + δt) − Q n 1 (t)) (Q n 2 (t + δt) − Q n 2 (t)) | Q n (t) = q n ] = o(δt) for all n = 1, 2, . . . . (44) Using (42)- (44) we can derive the infinitesimal rates for the X n,d process. Specifically,
for small δt and large n. (Note the similarity between these expressions and the limiting infinitesimal drift given in the statement of the Proposition.) Similar expressions can be obtained for the infinitesimal variance. Using standard weak convergence arguments for Markov processes, as in Maglaras and Zeevi (2004) , we can now establish that X n,d (·) ⇒ X d (·). To complete the proof of the proposition note that
and apply the continuous-mapping theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3:
The main challenge is to compare the explicit performance characterization for the system with real-time information given in (22) with the implicit equilibrium characterization given for the system with static information in (10) and (11).
We start by giving a skeleton of the proof.
Step 1: We will study a fictitious system where instead of D n,d (t), the system manager announces the state independent BE congestion estimate . Denote byZ(ξ) the steady state random variable associated with the "sum" process in this system.
Step 2: Set ξ = E(Z d ) + . We demonstrate that E(Z(ξ)) + > E(Z d ) + , which implies that ED(ξ) := E(Z(ξ)) + /κ 2 > ED d .
Step 3: Now consider the function h(ξ) = ξ − E(Z(ξ)) + It is easy to verify that h(·) is continuous, increasing, and that h(0) < 0 and h(∞) > 0. This implies that the equation h(ξ) = 0 has a unique solution ξ * , which defines the equilibrium of the system analyzed in Section 4; i.e., the equilibrium expected congestion cost for BE users is ED * = ξ * κ 2
. Given (ii) above we get that for ξ = E(Z d ) + , h(E(Z d ) + ) < 0, which by the monotonicity property of h(·) implies that E(Z d ) + < E(Z) + , and, in turn, that ED d < ED.
Step 1: Consider the fictitious system that announces to arriving BE-users the congestion estimate ξ/κ 2 √ n, for the particular choice ξ = E(Z d ) + . From (31) we get that
and note that ED = ξ/κ 2 . Using the analysis of Section 4, we have that the corresponding limit system is one with parameterγ = αξ = 2 π α α+ √ α . For such a system, E(Z(ξ)) + = φ(γ) γ(γΦ(γ) + φ(γ)) .
Step 2: The goal is to show that E(Z(ξ)) + < ξ, when ξ = E(Z d ) + . For any fixed α > 0, define g(α) := E(Z(ξ)) + ξ = δ(γ) π 2 (1 + √ α) 2 where ξ = E(Z d ) + , and δ(γ) = φ(γ) γΦ(γ)+φ(γ) . We wish to show that for all α > 0, g(α) > 1. Note that g(α) is continuous in α for all α > 0. To establish that g(α) > 1, it suffices to show that lim α↓0 g(α) > 1, and that g(α) is monotonically increasing in α.
Note that as α → 0,γ → 0, δ(γ) → 1 and lim α→0 g(α) = π 2 > 1. Also, as α → ∞,γ → 2 π , δ(γ) → δ( which follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the bounding system described in Step 2.
As noted above, E|(Q n 1 +Q n 2 − n)/ √ n| 4 is bounded uniformly in n when the arrival rate is such that √ n(1 − ρ n ) → γ > 0. We now turn to the second term on the right-hand-side. Fix ǫ > 0 such that κ 1 + ǫ < 1 (this is feasible since κ 1 < 1). Then, where the last step follows from the fact that the terms {n/(n − j) 4 } are bounded by a constant in the first summation on the right-hand-side, and bounded by n 4 in the second summation on the right-hand-side. Now, by Lemma 1 in the proof of Theorem 1, we have that
where the constants depend on ǫ. Thus, sup n n 4 P(Q n 1 > (κ 1 + ǫ)n) < ∞ .
Since { √ nD n } is uniformly integrable, we have that √ nED n → κ −1 2 E(X 1 + X 2 ) + . But when µ 1 = µ 2 = µ, Z = X 1 + X 2 has the simple stationary distribution identified in Theorem 1 of Halfin and Whitt (1981) ; see also Maglaras and Zeevi (2004) . Specifically, P(Z ≤ z|Z ≤ 0) = Φ(γ + z)/Φ(γ) z ≤ 0 P(Z > z|Z > 0) = exp(−zγ) z > 0.
This gives the expression for d(γ) given in (11). Finally, P(Q n 1 + Q n 2 ≥ n) = P(X n 1 + X n 2 > 0) and the latter converges to P(Z > 0) which by the above is easily seen to be equal to κ 2 γd(γ) =: ν(γ).
This concludes the proof.
